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South African Contract Law: The Need for
a Concept of Unconscionability
LYNN BERAT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a decade of economic difficulties, caused in part by the
imposition of sanctions, South Africa remains the economic power-
house of southern Africa.' Now, as the ruling National Party and
major opposition groups such as the African National Congress 2
("ANC") seek to arrive at a new dispensation of the country's wealth,
the future shape of the economy is a vexing issue. 3 South Africa's
escape from its downward economic spiral requires economic growth.
Such growth is especially important if Africans, who for decades have
occupied an inferior position in South African society, are to partici-
pate fully in South Africa's economic life. To achieve this goal, con-
tract law will have to be altered. In particular, the courts should
develop a doctrine of unconscionability to safeguard the interests of
the millions of Africans entering into contracts and other business
transactions for the first time. As many Africans are disadvantaged
by little or no education,4 and are daunted by the prospect of dealing
with an unfamiliar legal system,5 it is imperative that such a doctrine
exist to protect their rights. Currently, South African contract law
contains no specific concept of unconscionability. The concept's posi-
* Member of the Texas Bar. J.D., University of Texas, 1983; Ph.D., Yale University,
1988. The author, a Lecturer at Yale Law School and Assistant Coordinator of Yale's Career
Development Fellowship Program for Southern Africans, is also a regular consultant to the
Ford Foundation on South African and Namibian issues.
1. See Lynn Berat, Undoing and Redoing Business in South Africa: The Lifting of the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and the Continuing Validity of State and LocalAnti-
Apartheid Legislation, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 7 (1991).
2. The African National Congress is described in TOM LODGE, BLACK POLITICS IN
SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1945 (1983).
3. See Berat, supra note 1, at 9-11; Lynn Berat, The Courts and the Economy in a New
South Africa: A Call for an Indexation Model, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1992).
4. See generally FRANCIS WILSON & MAMPHELA RAMPHELE, UPROOTING POVERTY:
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHALLENGE (1988).
5. The future of customary law, as opposed to the western-based South African national
system, remains unresolved. For a discussion of this problem, see Lynn Berat, Customary Law
in a New South Africa: A Proposal, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 92 (1991).
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tion is the same as that in the United States in 1952, when jurist Ar-
thur Corbin wrote:
There is sufficient flexibility in the concepts of fraud, duress, mis-
representation, and undue influence, not to mention differences in
economic bargaining power, to enable the courts to avoid enforce-
ment of a bargain that is shown to be unconscionable by reason of
gross inadequacy of consideration accompanied by other relevant
factors.
6
Indeed, these doctrines, which reflect South Africa's hybrid legal heri-
tage, form the South African analogue to unconscionability. It now
seems imperative that a more explicit concept of unconscionability
similar to that found in the United States' Uniform Commercial
Code7 ("U.C.C.") be developed in a transformed South Africa. This
Article examines South Africa's hybrid legal heritage. It provides an
overview of contract formation in South Africa and discusses the con-
cepts of fraud, duress, and undue influence. Finally, this Article sug-
gests that South Africa adopt a commercial code, giving special
attention to formulating a concept of unconscionability.
A. The South African Legal Heritage
Scholars have characterized South African law as a hybrid or
mixed legal system,8 consisting mainly of Roman, Roman-Dutch, and
English law.9 Roman law evolved over twelve centuries, from around
753 B.C., the traditional date. of Rome's founding, to A.D. 565, the
date of Emperor Justinian's death.10 Continuing through medieval
times, Roman law had a major influence upon European institu-
6. ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 188 (1952).
7. Section 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to pres-
ent evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in mak-
ing its determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990).
8. Imre Zajtay & W.J. Hosten, The Permanence of Roman Law Concepts in the Conti-
nental Legal System and South African Law, 2 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 181, 197 (1969).
9. See JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 8
(1978).
10. See W.J. HOSTEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 132 (1983) (discussing South Africa's mixed system of law).
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tions."1 The late thirteenth century through the end of the sixteenth
century marked the period of reception of Roman law into the law of
the Netherlands. 12 The resulting Roman-Dutch law "is a conglomer-
ate of Roman law, Germanic customary law, feudal law, canon law,"
and natural law concepts.' 3 It enjoyed its classical period from the
sixteenth century to the late eighteenth century.' 4
The Dutch East India Company brought this classical Roman-
Dutch law to the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, when it took posses-
sion of the Cape and founded a station there for its ships traveling the
Netherlands to the Dutch East Indies route. 5 Roman-Dutch law
continued as the Cape's common law during the period of Dutch East
India Company rule from 1652 to 1795. In 1795, Great Britain occu-
pied the Cape, fearing that the French Republic would seize it.16 The
Dutch East India Company formally capitulated to the British on
September 16, 1795.17 The Articles of Capitulation empowered the
Raad van Justitie, renamed the Court of Justice, to administer Ro-
man-Dutch law in civil and criminal matters.' In 1802, Britain en-
tered into a truce with Napoleon, and, in March of that year, signed
the Treaty of Amiens, restoring all of its recent colonial conquests
except Ceylon and Trinidad. 19 Thus, Great Britain ceded its author-
ity to the Netherlands, which had become the Batavian Republic by
that time.20 The British, however, remained cautious of Napoleon's
colonial designs, and by 1806 again controlled the Cape.21
British rule did not signal the end of Roman-Dutch law at the
Cape. The Cape Articles of Capitulation of January 10 and 18, 1806,
provided that "the Burghers and Inhabitants shall preserve all their
Rights and Privileges which they have enjoyed hitherto. '22 Some
scholars claim this provision ensured the perpetuation of Roman-
11. WOLFGANG KUNKEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LEGAL AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY 168-78 (1966). For more on Roman law, see FRITZ SCHULTZ, HISTORY OF
ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE (1946).
12. See DUGARD, supra note 9, at 8; HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 175.
13. HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 174.
14. DUGARD, supra note 9, at 8; HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 175.
15. LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 41-43 (1990).
16. Id. at 43.
17. HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 194.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 195-96.
20. Id. at 194.
21. Id. at 195.
22. Cape Colony, Articles of Capitulation, Nos. 11, 12 (1806).
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Dutch law.23 The well-established principle of English law that "the
laws of a conquered country continue in force, until they are altered
by the conqueror" also protected Roman-Dutch law.24 However, the
legal system at the Cape did not escape English influences. Indeed,
the British government envisioned English law gradually assimilating
Roman-Dutch law.25 In 1823, the British government appointed a
commission to review colony affairs. 26 Reporting in 1826 on judicial
matters at the Cape, the commission suggested that the existing pro-
cedure should assimilate English procedure, future legislation should
follow principles of English jurisprudence, and the courts should
gradually adopt English common law.27
In the years after 1826, this policy engendered numerous legisla-
tive changes that greatly affected procedure, evidence, and succession.
For example, Ordinance No. 40 of 1928 restyled Cape criminal proce-
dure in the manner of English criminal procedure. 28 Ordinance No.
72 of 1830 adopted the English law of evidence with minor modifica-
tions.29 Civil procedure also experienced a remodeling along English
lines, although some Roman-Dutch procedures remained. In 1833,
Ordinance No. 104 replaced the Roman-Dutch law of universal suc-
cession of heirs with the English system of executorship. 30  In 1845,
Ordinance No. 15 established the English underhand form of will.31
Additionally, the Law of Inheritance Amendment Act 32 and the Suc-
cession Act 33 removed various restrictions on testamentary transfers.
The English legal system greatly influenced mercantile law, com-
pany law, and insolvency law. Cape statutes adopted English statutes
verbatim by reference or by repromulgation. These included the
Merchant Shipping Act of 1855; 34 the General Law Amendment Act
of 1879, governing maritime and shipping law, fire, life, and marine
23. See, e.g., H.D.J. Bodenstein, English Influences on the Common Law of South Africa,
32 S. AFR. L.J. 337, 339 (1915); N.J. De Wet, Die Romeins-Hollandse Reg in Suid-Afrika no
1806, 21 TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG 239, 239 n.2 (1958).
24. Campbell v. Hall, [1774] 1 Cowp. 204, 209 (Eng. K.B.); see DUGARD, supra note 9, at
8.
25. HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 199.
26. See id. at 199-202.
27. Id.
28. Cape Colony, Ordinance No. 40 (1828).
29. Cape Colony, Ordinance No. 72 (1830).
30. Cape Colony, Ordinance No. 104 (1833).
31. Cape Colony, Ordinance No. 15 (1845).
32. Cape Colony, Act No. 26 (1873).
33. Cape Colony, Act No. 23 (1874).
34. Cape Colony, Act No. 13 (1855).
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insurance, stoppage in transit, and bills of lading;35 the Joint Stock
Companies Limited Liability Act of 1861;36 and the Companies Act
of 1892. 3
7
English law also had a non-legislative impact. The English lan-
guage dominated the courts, English judges occupied the bench, and
English legal training was required for advocates. 38 The use of the
English system of government also meant the introduction of English
principles of constitutional law.39 Although Roman-Dutch law re-
mained the basic common law of the Cape, by the end of the nine-
teenth century, it had been thoroughly infused with English law. 40
Meanwhile, in the nineteenth century, Roman-Dutch law spread
from the Cape to the Afrikaner republics of the Transvaal and the
Orange Free State and to the British colony of Natal.41 All three
adopted the Roman-Dutch system, but English law, operating
through the law of the Cape Colony, soon modified it.42 After the
1899-1902 South African War,4 3 in 1910, the two former Afrikaner
republics and the two British colonies formed the Union of South Af-
rica, 4 which remained until the Union transformed itself into the Re-
public of South Africa in 1961. 45 The pronouncement about the
common law notwithstanding, the South African legal system had
clearly become a "three-layer cake" of Roman, Roman-Dutch, and
English law.46 These influences continue to manifest themselves in
35. Cape Colony, Act No. 8 (1879).
36. Cape Colony, Act No. 23 (1861).
37. Cape Colony, Act No. 25 (1892).
38. HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 198; see also Bodenstein, supra note 23.
39. HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 198-99.
40. Id. at 200.
41. For a constitutional history of the Afrikaner republics, see Leonard Thompson, Con-
stitutionalism in the South African Republics, BUTTERWORTH'S S. AFR. L. REV. 49 (1954).
42. HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 201-03.
43. See Lynn Berat, Constitutionalism and Mineral Law in the Struggle for a New South
Africa: The South African War Revisited, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 61 (1992).
44. See LEONARD THOMPSON, THE UNIFICATION OF SOUTH AFRICA 1902-1910, at 459
(1960).
45. THOMPSON, supra note 15, at 188.
46. Zajtay & Hosten, supra note 8, at 197. One judge wrote:
Our country has reached a stage in its national development when its existing law
can better be described as South African than Roman-Dutch.... No doubt its roots
are Roman-Dutch, and splendid roots they are. But continuous development has
come through adaptation to modem conditions, through case law, through statutes,
and through the adoption of certain principles and features of English law .... The
original sources of the Roman-Dutch law are important, but exclusive preoccupation
with them is like trying return the oak tree to its acorn.
Ex parte de Winnaar, [1959] 1 S.A. 837, 839 (S. Afr. N.P.D.).
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modem South African contract law.
II. CONTRACTS AND THEIR LEGAL EFFECTS
In Roman law, only four types of agreements constituted en-
forceable contracts. These were (1) contracts re, in which a party de-
livered a thing (res) to the other and could, therefore, claim redelivery
or counterperformance from the other; (2) contracts literis, in which a
creditor made an entry in his or her domestic account books relating
to a debt owed to the creditor and that entry made the debt enforcea-
ble; (3) contracts verbis, in which the agreement was made orally in
the form of question and answer; such a contract was called a stipula-
tio and was enforceable because of its form; and (4) contracts con-
sensu, in which agreement was enough to make a contract of sale,
partnership, hire, or mandate binding.
47
Roman law required agreement and causa, or cause, to constitute
a valid contract.48 Causa could be found in contracts re by delivery of
the thing; in contracts literis by the entry in the books; in contracts
verbis by the form of words used; and in contracts consensu by the
agreement itself. An agreement that did not fall into one of these four
classes was not enforceable and was called a nudum pactum.49 The
rule appeared in the maxim, Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio, meaning
no action arises from a bare agreement. Not enforceable by action, a
nudum pactum gave rise to a natural obligation and could be used as
a defense.
The causa requirement grew increasingly meaningless because of
a European-developed rule that made all serious agreements actiona-
ble. By the seventeenth century, this had become the rule in Hol-
land. 50  Nevertheless, some writers still followed the older
terminology and insisted that causa was necessary for contracts to be
valid.51 In England, the courts did not require causa for a valid con-
tract. 52 However, except with regard to sealed covenants, the courts
demanded that there be consideration, a counterperformance, or quid
pro quo.53 By the nineteenth century, English ideas had so influenced
legal thought at the Cape that many believed Roman-Dutch refer-
47. KUNKEL, supra note 11, at 168-78.
48. Conradie v. Roussouw, 1919 A.D. 279 (S. Afr.).
49. Id. at 290.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 294.
53. See Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 294.
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ences to causa meant the same thing as consideration did to the Eng-
lish.54 The courts in the Transvaal dismissed this view. 55 The issue
remained controversial until 1919, when the Appellate Division of the
South African Supreme Court ("Appellate Division") accepted the
Transvaal view.
56
Under modem South African law, a contract is an agreement
between or among persons that gives rise to personal rights and corre-
sponding obligations. 57 Although a contract is an agreement legally
binding on the parties, 58 not all agreements bind the parties. Rather,
an agreement is a contract only if it has a number of essential ele-
ments: (1) the agreement is for future performance or non-perform-
ance by one or more of the parties; 59 (2) the parties have the legal
capacity to contract;6° (3) the parties seriously intend to bind them-
selves;6' (4) with few exceptions, the agreement is executed with some
formality and in writing;62 and (5) the agreement is not contrary to
statutory law, public policy, or good morals in its formation, perform-
ance, or purpose.
63
If these five elements are present, the agreement becomes a le-
gally binding contract. 64 However, "legally binding" does not mean
that the law inevitably compels the parties to perform their promises
or undertakings, because the law cannot or will not compel certain
types of performance. 65 Each party to a contract acquires a right
against the other party for the agreed upon performance, as well as
54. See id.
55. See, e.g., Rood v. WaUach, 1904 T.S. 187, 209 (S. Mr.).
56. Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 317.
57. J.C. DE WET & A.H. VAN WYK, DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE KONTRAKTEREG EN
HANDELSREG 4 (1978).
58. However, parties can sometimes be bound by a contract even though they are not
really in agreement. George v. Fairmead (Pty) Ltd., [1958] 2 S.A. 465 (S. Afr. App. Div.).
59. Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 317. See generally J.W. WESSELS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT
IN SouTH AFRICA 12-24 (1951); I.G. FARLAM & E.W. HATHAWAY, A CASE BOOK ON THE
SouTH AFRICAN LAW OF CoNTRACT 9-64 (1979).
60. Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 288. See generally WESSELS, supra note 59, at 12-24;
FARLAM & HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 9-64.
61. Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 288. See generally WESSELS, supra note 59, at 12-24;
FARLAM & HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 9-64.
62. Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 287. See generally WESSELS, supra note 59, at 12-24;
FARLAM & HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 9-64.
63. Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 288. See generally WESSELS, supra note 59, at 12-24;
FARLAM & HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 9-64.
64. See Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 288. See generally WESSELS, supra note 59, at 12-24;
FARLAM & HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 9-64.
65. Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 301-02. See generally WESSELS, supra note 59, at 12-24;
FARLAM & HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 9-64.
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for a corresponding obligation." Each party has a duty to perform
this obligation, which gives the other party a cause of action for spe-
cific performance when the party fails to perform. 67 Should the other
party not comply with court-ordered specific performance, then the
plaintiff has a cause of action for damages.68 However, a court will
not order specific performance for certain types of contracts, such as
unenforceable contracts, contracts void ab initio, and voidable
contracts.
An unenforceable contract is one on which no action can be
brought.69 No legal obligation may be imposed, but a natural obliga-
tion remains.70 Since 1969, when the South African government
passed the Prescription Act,71 only wagering contracts or bets have
constituted unenforceable contracts.72
A contract is void ab initio if it lacks one or more of the elements
necessary to the formation of a contract.73 Such an agreement has no
legal effect from its inception. 74 An agreed upon performance prohib-
ited by law is an example of this type of contract. 75 Others include
contracts lacking a definite agreement on the terms of performance, or
contracts involving an insane party.76 These agreements give no legal
rights to either party.77 One or both of the parties cannot later ratify
these agreements. 7 In addition, registration will not validate an
agreement that is void ab initio.79 A court order is not necessary to
set it aside because the agreement is deemed to be worthless.80
Although a void contract gives neither side a cause of action, if one
party has performed the terms of the agreement, the court may some-
66. Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 301-02. See generally WESSELS, supra note 59, at 12-24;
FARLAM & HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 9-64.
67. Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 304. See generally WESSELS, supra note 59, at 12-24;
FARLAM & HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 9-64.
68. Conradie, 1919 A.D. at 304. See generally WESSELS, supra note 59, at 12-24;
FARLAM & HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 9-64.
69. See generally PHILIP MILLIN & GEORGE WILLE, WILLE AND MILLIN'S MERCAN-
TILE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 29-58 (J.F. Coaker & D.T. Zeffertt eds., 18th ed. 1984).
70. Id.
71. Republic of South Africa, Prescription Act No. 68 (1969).
72. See id.
73. See MILLIN & WILLE, supra note 69, at 91.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 71, 91.
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times grant the party redress by restoring the property or by granting
monetary compensation."'
Unlike contracts void ab initio, voidable contracts contain all of
the essential elements of an agreement. However, some flaw exists at
the time the agreement was made, which entitles the parties to repudi-
ate the contract and ask that both parties be restored, if possible, to
their original positions.8 2 Such reinstatement is termed restitutio in
integrum.8 3  A flawed contract is voidable at the option of the
prejudiced party.84 Yet, unless and until the prejudiced party justifia-
bly repudiates it, the contract is prima facie valid and binding on the
parties.8 5 A court order declaring the contract rescinded is not neces-
sary, as it only determines that party's right to end the contract.
8 6
The flaws that make a contract voidable are of three types: fraudulent
or non-fraudulent misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence.
These three flaws form the South African equivalent of the doctrine of
unconscionability as applied in the United States and elsewhere. The
interplay between duress and undue influence evidences the continu-
ing tensions between Roman-Dutch and English law present in South
Africa's mixed legal heritage.
III. UNCONSCIONABILITY SOUTH AFRICAN-STYLE:
MISREPRESENTATION, DURESS, AND UNDUE INFLUENCE
A. Misrepresentation
In the formation of contracts, a party's mistaken motive is irrele-
vant and does not prevent the parties to the contract from reaching an
agreement.8 7 However, an action may lie if the mistake was caused by
misrepresentation. 8 A party who has been persuaded by misrepre-
sentation to enter into a contract or to accept terms to which he or
she otherwise would not have agreed is entitled to relief if the repre-
sentation was intentional, negligent, or innocent.
81. See id.





87. For example, X buys a 1966 Ford Mustang from Y. Both believe the car has a V8
engine, but later determine that it has a V6 engine.
88. See H.R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE UNION OF SoUTH AFRICA: DEVELOP-
MENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION 463 (1960).
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1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Fraudulent misrepresentation is a precontractual false statement
of fact intentionally made by one party to a contract, that induces the
other party to enter into the contract or to agree to terms to which he
or she would not have agreed had the truth been known 9 Fraudu-
lent misrepresentation requires five elements. First, there must be a
precontractual false statement of fact. This statement can include the
expression of an opinion that is not honestly held. ° The statement
need not be explicit, and conduct can suffice,9 ' as can silence, if the
silence fails to rectify an incorrect impression.92 Second, the misrep-
resentation must be wrongful, meaning unlawful. A fraudulent mis-
representation is a tort, called a delict, in South Africa.93 For tort
liability, the act complained of must have been wrongful. Thus, if the
misrepresentation was unlawful under the circumstances, liability
arises. However, the courts pay particular attention only to cases
where the misrepresentation was based on a wrongful omission.94
Wrongfulness is assumed where misrepresentation by words or other
positive conduct induced the contract or led a party to accept terms to
which he or she otherwise would not have agreed. 95 Third, the mis-
representation must be made fraudulently. Misrepresentations are
made fraudulently when the maker does not honestly believe the truth
of his or her statement and intends the other party to act on it.96
Fourth, the misrepresentation must induce the other party to con-
clude the contract or to agree to its terms. A court will not find liabil-
ity for fraudulent misrepresentation unless there is proof of a causal
89. Id.
90. A.J.C. Copeling, Copyright in Ideas?, 28 TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-
HOLLANDSE REG 3 (1965).
91. Displaying a used car among new ones is an example of conduct constituting fraudu-
lent misrepresentation.
92. M.A. Millner, Fraudulent Non-Disclosure, 74 S. AFR. L.J. 177, 179-80 (1957).
93. Trotman v. Edwick, [1951] 1 S.A. 443 (S. Aft. App. Div.); De Jager v. Grunder,
(1964] 1 S.A. 446 (S. Afr. App. Div.); Ranger v. Wykerd, [1977] 2 S.A. 976 (S. Aft. App.
Div.).
94. Failing to speak is wrongful if there was a duty to speak. On the duty to speak, see
Bodemer v. American Ins. Co., [1961] 2 S.A. 662, 669 (S. Afr. App. Div.) (a contract uber-
rimaefidei imposes a duty to speak); Glaston House (Pty) Ltd. v. Inag (Pty) Ltd., [1977] 2
S.A. 846, 867-69 (S. Afr. App. Div.) (duty to speak if seller knows of latent defects in item
sold).
95. The misrepresentation must be related to the material facts. Karroo v. Farr, 1921
A.D. 413, 415 (S. Aft.). Puffing alone is not actionable. DIG 4.3.37 (Ulpian, Sabinus, bk. 44);
Voet Commentarius 21.1.3.
96. Rex v. Myers, [1948] 1 S.A. 375, 382 (S. Afr. App. Div.).
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link between the misrepresentation and the act of the misled party in
concluding the contract or agreeing to certain terms.97 Fifth, the mis-
representation must be made by the other party to the contract or by
a third party acting in collusion with, or as an agent of, one of the
parties to the contract. A fraudulent inducement from an independ-
ent third party does not affect the contract.9
The parties to a contract cannot agree between themselves to ex-
clude remedies for fraudulent misrepresentation. 99 Furthermore, the
misrepresenting party cannot claim that the aggrieved party, as a rea-
sonable person, should not have been misled.100 A contracting party
who has been the victim of a fraudulent misrepresentation has a
choice of two remedies: The party may accept the contract or rescind
it and receive restitutio in integrum.10 The right to choose a remedy
is clear where the party would not have entered into the contract
without the misrepresentation. This is dolus dans causam contrac-
turn, or causal fraud. Incidental fraud, or dolus incidens in contrac-
turn, is found in situations where no causal fraud occurred. Instead,
the party agreed to terms to which he or she otherwise would not
have agreed. The South African law regarding incidental fraud is
unclear.
A party may choose rescission as a defense against the other
party's action on the contract or upon filing an action. 102 Whether he
or she accepts or rescinds the contract, the aggrieved party has an
action in tort for any loss suffered. 0 3 A party must elect to rescind
within a reasonable time after the party learns of the misrepresenta-
tion, or lose the right. 104 Once a party elects a remedy, he or she must
abide by it.105 If a party chooses rescission, he or she must restore to
the other party that which he or she received under the contract.1°6
However, the court may decline to follow this rule if justice
97. Geldenhuys v. Beuthin, 1918 A.D. 426 (S. Afr.).
98. Principal Immigration Officer v. Bhula, 1931 A.D. 323, 330 (S. Aft.).
99. Wells v. S.A. Alumenite Co., 1927 A.D. 69 (S. Aft.).
100. See generally Copeling, supra note 90.
101. Bowditch v. Peel, 1921 A.D. 561 (S. Afr.); Frost v. Leslie, 1923 A.D. 276 (S. Afr.).
See generally Wouter de Vos, Skadevergoeding en Terugtrede weens Bedrog by Kontraksluiting,
1964 ACTA JURIDICA 26.
102. Karroo, 1921 A.D. at 413; Schultz v. Meyerson, 1933 W.L.D. 199 (S. Afr.).
103. Bowditch, 1921 A.D. at 561.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Marks Ltd. v. Laughton, 1919 A.D. 12 (S. Afr.); Van Schalkwyk v. Prinsloo, [1948] 1
S.A. 460 (S. Aft. T.P.D.); Van Heerden v. Sentrale Kunsmis Korp (Edms.) Bpk, [1973] 1 S.A.
17 (S. Aft. App. Div.).
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requires. 107
The measure of the injured party's damages is the difference be-
tween the party's current financial situation and the financial situation
he or she would have been in had the misrepresentation not been
made. 108 If the party chooses rescission and restitution, damages are
usually calculated on the basis of wasted costs. However, if the con-
tract is upheld, calculation becomes more difficult, with the method
depending upon the circumstances.'1 9 The court always endeavors to
determine the detriment suffered by the aggrieved party because of
the misrepresentation.10 Nevertheless, two generalizations may be
made. First, in a causal fraud case, the court typically determines
damages by subtracting the value of the performance made by the
misrepresenting party from the value of the performance made by the
aggrieved party.1"' The court then adds any consequential loss suf-
fered by the aggrieved party. 112 Second, in an incidental fraud case,
the court often calculates damages by subtracting the price that would
have been paid if there had been no misrepresentation from the price
actually paid. 113 The court then adds any consequential loss. 114
2. Non-Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Non-fraudulent misrepresentation is the negligent or innocent
misrepresentation by one party to a contract that induces the other
party to enter into a contract or to agree to terms to which the party
would not have agreed had he or she known the truth. 5 Thus, non-
fraudulent misrepresentation has the same elements as fraudulent
misrepresentation," 16 except that the misrepresentation is made negli-
gently or innocently" 7 rather than intentionally.
107. Marks Ltd., 1919 A.D. at 12; Van Schalkwyk, [1948] 1 S.A. at 460; Van Heerden,
[1973] 1 S.A. at 17.
108. Trotman, [1951] 1 S.A. at 448; see also De Jager, [1964] 1 S.A. at 446.
109. Bowditch, 1921 A.D. at 562-63; Frost, 1921 A.D. at 280-81.
110. Trotman, [1951] 1 S.A. at 443; see also De Jager, [1964] 1 S.A. at 446. See generally
G.A. Mulligan, Some Remedies for Breach of Contract, 75 S. AFR. L.J. 391 (1958); de Vos,
supra note 101, at 26.
111. Frost, 1921 A.D. at 280.
112. See id. at 279-80.
113. Trotman, [1951] 1 S.A. at 448.
114. Frost, 1921 A.D. at 280.
115. See Herschel v. Mrupe, [1954] 3 S.A. 464 (S. Aft. App. Div.).
116. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
117. According to the South African law of delict, negligent misrepresentation gives rise to
the delictual actio legis Aquiliae, legal action, for damages in the same manner as a fraudulent
misrepresentation. Herschel, [1954] 3 S.A. at 464.
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Under Roman law, a party could plead the exceptio doli to a
claim on a contract concluded on the basis of an innocent misrepre-
sentation. 118 Although Roman-Dutch law accepted this rule,119
neither Roman nor Roman-Dutch law provided a cause of action for
innocent misrepresentation. In 1907, South African law departed
from this position and allowed the innocent party to sue for rescission
and restitution, but did not permit the recovery of damages.
120
Twenty years later, the Appellate Division determined that the parties
can, by prior agreement, exclude remedies for non-fraudulent
misrepresentation. 121
In 1959, the Orange Free State Provincial Division held that
there was no reason for denying a claim for restitutional damages to a
buyer who had entered into a contract of sale as a result of the seller's
material, innocent misrepresentation. 122 The courts in the Trans-
vaalF23 and Natal 124 also adopted this position.
Finally, in 1973, the Appellate Division addressed remedies for
non-fraudulent misrepresentation in Phame (Pty) Ltd. v. Paizes.125
The court established two rules concerning remedies regarding sales
contracts. First, a buyer can claim either rescission or restitution with
the actio redhibitoria.26 The buyer can claim restitutional damages,
abatement of the purchase price, with the actio quanti minoris if he or
she has been misled by a seller's misrepresentation that constituted a
dictum et promissum. 12 7 The party to whom the misrepresentation is
made may raise the exceptio redhibitoria or the exceptio quanti minoris
as a defense to an action by the seller.' 28 Second, if the seller's repre-
sentation is not a dictum et promissum, or if the representation is
made to a party to a contract other than a sales contract, the party to
whom the misrepresentation is made may claim rescission and restitu-
tion or may raise the exceptio doli as a defense to an action by the
118. DIG. 44.4.2.5 (Ulpian, Edict, bk. 76).
119. See Van der Linden Supp. ad Voet 4 3 1.
120. HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 88, at 458-70; Ellison Kahn, Innocent Misrepresentation:
No Abiding by Contract and Claiming Restitutionary Damages, 74 S. Ala. L.J. 133 (1957).
121. Wells, 1927 A.D. at 69.
122. Hall v. Milner, [1959] 2 S.A. 304 (S. Afr. O.P.D.).
123. See, e.g., Van Schalkwyk v. Prinsloo, [1961] 1 S.A. 665, 665 (S. Afr. T.P.R.).
124. See, e.g., Van Niekerk v. Thompson Motors, [1966] 2 Phip. A70 (S. Afr.).
125. [1973] 3 S.A. 397, 407 (S. Afr. App. Div.).
126. One example is a material statement by the seller to the buyer during the negotiations
that bears on the quality of the thing sold and goes beyond mere praise and commendation.
127. Phame (Pry) Ltd., [1973] 3 S.A. at 407.
128. Id.
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other party. 129 In such cases, no action for restitution arises.
B. Duress
Duress, which derived from Roman-Dutch law, occurs when a
person acts through fear of actual or threatened danger. Three ele-
ments must exist to establish a claim of duress. First, there must be a
threat of imminent or inevitable harm to the life, person, honor, or
property of a person or family member. 3 0 Threats of criminal prose-
cution will suffice. 13 ' Likewise, threats to destroy or forfeit property,
known as duress of goods, permit the property owner to repudiate any
contract extorted by the threats.
32
The second element of duress is an unlawful threat. 33 A threat
is unlawful if the threatened conduct is unlawful in itself or the pur-
pose of the threat is unlawful, such as attempting to obtain something
to which one is not entitled. 3 4 A creditor's threat to institute civil
proceedings to enforce his or her rights is not unlawful as long as the
creditor does not try to obtain something to which he or she is not
entitled.1"5 A party entering into a contract under these circum-
stances cannot set it aside on the grounds of duress. 36
It is unlawful to threaten a person with criminal prosecution in
order to enforce a private debt if the other party did not commit the
crime or if the creditor is using the threat to obtain something to
which the creditor is not entitled.1" 7 A split of authority exists as to
whether the same result occurs if the debtor committed the crime and
the creditor seeks only that to which he or she is entitled. For exam-
129. Id.
130. GROTIUS, INLEIDING 3.48.6; VAN LEEUWEN, CENS FOR 1.4.41.2-.3; Broodryk v.
Smuts, 1942 Natal L.R. 47 (S. Afr.); Jans Rautenbach Produksies (Edms) Bpk v. Wijma
[1970] 4 S.A. 31 (S. Afr. T.P.D.); Shepstone v. Shepstone, [1974] 1 S.A. 411 (S. Mr. D. &
C.L.D.).
131. See, e.g., Broodryk, 1942 Natal L.R. at 47; Jans Rautenbach Produksies (Edms) Bpk,
[1970] 4 S.A. at 31; Arend v. Astra Furnishers (Pty) Ltd., [1974] 1 S.A. 765 (S. Mr. C.P.D.).
132. Hendricks v. Barnett, [1975] 1 S.A. 765 (S. Afr. N.P.D.). For example, if a person in
a position of authority unlawfully compels the owner of certain goods to pay or agree to pay
him or her money by threatening that failure to pay will result in a forfeiture of the goods, the
goods' owner is not bound if he or she protests at the time.
133. VOET 4.2.10; Broodryk, 1942 Natal L.R. at 47; Jans Rautenbach Produksies (Edms)
Bpk, [1970] 4 S.A. at 31; Arend, [1974] 1 S.A. at 765.
134. See P.J.J. Olivier, Onregmatige Vreesaanjaging, 28 TYDSRIKF VIR HEDENDAAGSE
ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG 187, 203 (1965).
135. VOET 2.4.10; Salter v. Haskins, 1914 T.P.D. 264 (S. Mr.).
136. VoET 2.4.10; Salter, 1914 T.P.D. at 264.
137. See MILLIN & WILLE, supra note 69, at 1212-13.
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ple, South African jurist Wessels wrote that "[t]he threat to prosecute
a person for a crime involving imprisonment unless he enters into a
contract is sufficient mortal violence to justify the setting aside of the
contract."' 38 In contrast, the Transvaal Provincial Division of the
Supreme Court13 9 and the Durban and Coast Local Division of the
Supreme Court' 40 believe that if the debtor committed the crime and
the creditor seeks no more than that to which he or she is entitled, the
threat of criminal proceedings is lawful. The Cape Provincial Divi-
sion has not yet decided the issue, but, should the case arise, the court
is likely to determine that the threat of criminal procedure is contra
bonos mores or against public policy, even if the debtor has committed
the crime and the creditor seeks no more than that which the creditor
is due.141 All South African courts should adopt this view. It seems
inappropriate that the criminal process, aimed at protecting society at
large, can be used to enforce private rights. Moreover, irrespective of
duress, every threat of criminal prosecution implies that there will not
be future prosecution if the desired contract is concluded. All such
contracts implicitly are agreements to stop prosecutions or to com-
pound crimes and will be void as against public policy.
The third element of duress is that the threat must have induced
the threatened party to enter into the contract or to agree to terms to
which he or she otherwise would not have agreed. 142 Hence, the
threat and the contract must have a causal link. Many jurisdictions
also require the victim's reasonable fear, 43 although the victim's fear
does not make the contract voidable. On the other hand, obtaining
the victim's consent by improper means does make the contract void-
able.'4 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the unreasonableness of
the victim's fear has inferential value in deciding whether the threats
actually induced the formation of the contract. If reasonable fear
were required, any distinction made by courts between threats to an
individual and duress of goods where the victim can claim duress only
if he or she acted under protest, would also relate to proving a causal
link between the threat and the victim's subsequent conduct.
138. WESSELS, supra note 59, para. 1188.
139. See Jans Rautenbach Produksies (Edms) Bpk, [1970] 4 S.A. at 31.
140. Ilanga Wholesalers v. Ebrahim, [1974 2 S.A. 292 (S. Ar. D. & C.L.D.).
141. Arend, [1974] 1 S.A. at 765.
142. DIG. 4.2.6 (Gaius, Provincial Edict, bk. 4); VAN LEEUWEN, CENS FOR 1.4.41.1;
VOET 4.2.11; Steiger v. Union Gov., [1919] 40 Natal L.R. 75 (S. Afr.).
143. See Steiger, [1919] 40 Natal L.R. at 79.
144. GROTIUS, DE IURE B Ac P 2.11.7; DE WET & VAN WYK, supra note 57, at 44.
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With regard to remedies under Roman Law, a duress victim
could use the exceptio quod metus causa as a defense against an action
on the contract into which he or she had entered.1 45 A victim could
also claim restitutio in integrum in cases where he or she had already
performed the contractual terms. 46 In addition, a victim could ob-
tain damages with delictual actio quod metus causa.147 Roman-Dutch
law followed these precedents,148 and, following its Roman-Dutch
heritage, South African law allows the threatened party to accept the
contract or have it set aside. 149 In electing to avoid the contract, the
threatened party may either raise duress as a defense or claim restitu-
tio in integrum. Regardless of whether the threatened party accepts
or rejects the contract, the threatened party may receive delictual
damages in compensation for his or her negative interest.
C. Undue Influence
Like English common law, South African law holds that a con-
tract made under duress is voidable. 50 However, the English com-
mon law is much narrower than its South African counterpart. The
English concept comprises only cases of actual or threatened physical
violence to, or unlawful constraint of, the contracting party's per-
son. 1 51 The narrowness of the English common law concept of duress
resulted in intervention by courts of equity, which, through applica-
tion of the doctrine of constructive fraud, had broader jurisdiction
over contracts made without free consent than did the common law
courts. 52 The equity courts developed a doctrine of undue influence,
which provided relief in cases where a contract was procured through
improper pressure that did not rise to the level of duress. 53 It also
provided relief in cases where a special relationship existed between
145. See Mauerberger v. Mauerberger, [1948] 4 S.A. 902, 903-05 (S. Mr. C.P.D.).
146. GROTIUS, INLEIDING 3.48.6; GROTIUS, DE IURE B Ac P 2.11.7; VAN LEEUWEN,
CENS FOR 1.1.13.5-7; VoET, COMMENTARIUS 4.2.1.
147. GROTIUS, INLEIDING 3.48.6; GROTIus, DE lURE B Ac P 2.11.7; VAN LEEUWEN,
CENs FOR 1.1.13.5-7; VOET, COMMENTARIUS 4.2.1.
148. GROTIUS, INLEIDING 3.48.6; GROTIus, DE lURE B Ac P 2.11.7; VAN LEEUWEN,
CENS FOR 1.1.13.5-7; VOET, COMMENTARIUS 4.2.1.
149. Broodryk, 1942 Natal L.R. at 47; Jans Rautenbach Produksies (Edms) Bpk, [1970] 4
S.A. at 31; Shepstone, [1974] 1 S.A. at 411; Ilanga Wholesalers, [1974] 2 S.A. at 292; Arend,
[1974] 1 S.A. at 765.
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the contracting parties. 5 4 The two types of cases are distinguishable.
Where no special relationship exists between the parties, the party
alleging undue influence must prove that the other party imposed im-
proper pressure on him or her. 155 Where a special relationship does
exist, a presumption of undue influence arises, which the alleged un-
due influencer must rebut. 5 6 Many relationships give rise to the pre-
sumption, including those of parent-child, guardian-ward, religious
advisor-disciple, physician-patient, attorney-client, and trustee-cestui
que trust.
157
After the South African War, the courts in the Cape' 58 and Na-
tal,'5 9 and the Appellate Divisionl6° first referred to undue influence
as a ground for setting aside a contract. Some of the courts accepted
unquestioningly the proposition that the doctrine of undue influence
formed part of South African law. In 1948, the Cape Provincial Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court determined that undue influence had a
basis in South African law. 61 In reaching its decision, the Court
drew on previous decisions of South African courts, the writings of
several scholars, the views of various writers on the grounds for resti-
tutio in integrum, and on the fact that undue influence prevented true
consent. 62 Six years later, in Preller v. Jordaan,63 the Appellate Di-
vision accepted the view that undue influence provided a ground for
restitutio in integrum. 64 That decision marked the unambiguous ac-
ceptance in South African law of the rule that a party can avoid a
contract if the other party used undue influence to induce him or her
to enter into it. 165 The acceptance of this rule diverges from Roman-
Dutch practice, which is demonstrated by the minority judgment of
Van den Heever in Preller, and by the writings of South African jurist
De Wet in an examination of the sources the court relied upon in
Preller.166
154. Id.
155. Such cases fall under the doctrine of duress. For a discussion of the doctrine of du-
ress, see supra notes 130- 49.
156. CHESHIRE & FiFooT, supra note 150, at 286-90.
157. Id.
158. Yates v. Estate Yates, [1903] 20 S.C. 35 (S. Afr.).
159. Stride v. Wepener, 1903 T.H. 383 (S. Afr.).
160. Van Pletsen v. Henning, 1913 A.D. 82 (S. Afr.).
161. Mauerberger v. Mauerberger, [1948] 4 S.A. 902 (S. Afr. C.P.D.).
162. Id.
163. [1956] 1 S.A. 483 (S. Afr. App. Div.).
164. Id. at 499-503.
165. Id.
166. DE WET & VAN WYK, supra note 57, at 47-49.
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Despite acceptance of the general rule, the specific elements of
undue influence remain unclear. The English courts vaguely define
undue influence as "some unfair and improper conduct, some coer-
cion from outside, some overreaching, some form of cheating, and
generally, though not always, some personal advantage obtained by"
the guilty party. 167 The South African courts have not been more
precise. In Preller, the court found that the grounds for restitutio in
integrum were broad enough to include the case
where one person obtains an influence over another which weakens
the latter's powers of resistance and renders his will compliant, and
where such person then uses his influence in an unconscionable
manner to persuade the other to agree to a prejudicial transaction
which he would not have concluded with normal free will. 168
Then, in Patel v. Grobbelaar,69 the Appellate Division affirmed
the Transvaal Provincial Division's decision requiring a plaintiff as-
serting undue influence to prove three elements: (1) the defendant
exerted influence over him or her; (2) the influence weakened his or
her resistance and made him or her compliant; and (3) the defendant
used his or her influence unscrupulously to induce the plaintiff to
agree to a transaction which was prejudicial to him or her and which
he or she would not otherwise have entered. 70
In terms of remedies for undue influence, the injured party may
elect to accept the contract or to rescind it and claim restitutio in
integrum. The courts have not decided whether the party also has an
action for damages. However, if undue influence is to be accepted as
duress, a plaintiff would have an action for damages.
IV. THE NEED FOR A COMMERCIAL CODE WITH EMPHASIS ON
UNCONSCIONABILITY
As South Africa struggles to cast off apartheid's sordid legacy,
there is much discussion of a new constitution that will guarantee
human rights and equality before the law.' 7 1 There is also great de-
bate over whether such a document should guarantee economic
167. Allcard v. Skinner, [1887] 36 Ch. D. 145, 181 (Eng. C.A.).
168. Preller, [1956] 1 S.A. at 492.
169. [1974] 1 S.A. 532 (S. Aft. A.D.).
170. Id.
171. On the constitutional debate, see Lynn Berat, A New South Africa?: Prospects for an
Africanist Bill of Rights and a Transformed Judiciary, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 467,
467-84 (1991).
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rights. 172 This debate, however, centers on land and wealth redistri-
bution, and does not involve contract formation or the sanctity of
contracts. 1
73
Nevertheless, there are pressing reasons for those crafting a new
legal order for the country to pay particular attention to contract law.
To create a just society, the South African economy will have to ex-
pand dramatically. Expanding the economy will require infusions of
foreign capital, but such investment alone will not be enough to undo
the underlying problems of high unemployment, poverty, and de-
spair.174 Domestic economic growth will also have to be fueled by
greater African participation, primarily through small business crea-
tion and heightened presence in the consumer economy. In such an
environment, contracts, whether between businesses, between busi-
nesses and individuals, or between individuals, will assume a new im-
portance as the foundations facilitating economic change. Inevitably,
contract disputes will arise, particularly because middle class South
African blacks starting new businesses will not have established ad-
vice networks to rely on for assistance in making deals. Conse-
quently, it seems likely that many contract disputes will find their way
to court.
Historically, in South Africa, white judges enforced laws created
by whites in courts catering to white interests; 175 hence, it will be im-
portant for courts to be responsive to those wronged in contract dis-
putes. This is essential not only for economic stability but also for the
creation of much needed respect for the rule of law in general. The
courts' responsiveness is even more urgent because whites will con-
tinue to dominate the economy, the judiciary, and the bar in the fore-
seeable future. 17 6 Therefore, both South African courts and those
creating a new legal order for the country should make an effort to
define a coherent doctrine of unconscionability that favors the rights
of victims.
In terms of case law, courts should adopt a concept of unconscio-
nability that seeks to merge, where possible, the existing doctrines of
misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence. The success of this
merger will partly depend upon the continuing position of Roman-
Dutch law in the South African legal order, an issue not yet de-
172. Id. at 473-77.
173. Id.
174. Berat, supra note 1, at 13.
175. Berat, supra note 172, at 484-85.
176. Id.
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cided. 17 7 Even so, the hybrid legal heritage does not pose too formi-
dable an obstacle to the development of a judicial doctrine of
unconscionability.
Looking beyond the case law, any new government should adopt
a commercial code, perhaps modeled on the United States' Uniform
Commercial Code, 178 that would have explicit provisions on uncon-
scionability. Such provisions, developed in consultation with judges,
commercial lawyers, and consumer advocates, would help guide
judges in devising their standards. To better serve South Africa's un-
dereducated African population, the code should avoid legal jargon as
much as possible. Once adopted, the government should publicize the
code by distributing summaries for laypersons published in the official
language, which is likely to be English, 79 as well as in Afrikaans and
various African languages. The government should mobilize trade
unions, consumer groups, and those conducting secondary school
street law programs to familiarize people with the code. Both entre-
preneurs and consumers alike will then become comfortable with
commercial law and enter into transactions that will benefit the econ-
omy and, therefore, all South Africans.
V. CONCLUSION
South Africa has a hybrid legal system that combines elements of
Roman, Roman-Dutch, and English law. That mixed heritage is
readily apparent in South African contract law, which has never de-
veloped the concept of unconscionability as found in the law of the
United States and other countries, but instead relies upon the doc-
trines of misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence. As debates
rage in South Africa about the post-apartheid legal order, many of the
ills besetting the country demand eradication. The post-apartheid or-
der must involve the increased participation of Africans both as busi-
ness owners and consumers. To encourage that participation, there
should be a doctrine of unconscionability that favors the victims of
177. On the future of Roman-Dutch law, see, e.g., ALBIE SACHS, THE FUTURE OF
ROMAN-DUTCH LAW IN A NON-RACIAL DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA: SOME PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS (1989).
178. U.C.C. (1990).
179. On the language question, see Neville Alexander, Language Planning in South Africa
with Special Reference to the Harmonization of the Varieties of Nguni and Sotho, Paper
Presented at the Southern African Research Program Seminar, Yale University (Feb. 20,
1991); Neville Alexander, The Sociology of Language: Language Planning for a Democratic
South Africa, Paper Presented at the Southern African Research Program Seminar, Yale Uni-
versity (Oct. 17, 1990).
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unconscionable contracts. This should be developed in two ways.
First, the courts should harmonize existing doctrines and develop a
concept of unconscionability. Second, those responsible for commer-
cial law in any new government should adopt a commercial code that
employs a concept of unconscionability; such a code must avoid legal
jargon and be explained to laypersons through various education pro-
grams. Only by encouraging Africans to feel that the economy be-
longs to them will the growth so necessary to South Africa's stability
and survival be able to occur.

